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FINDING A REASONABLE WAY TO   
ENFORCE THE REASONABLE EFFORTS 
REQUIREMENT IN CHILD           
PROTECTION CASES 
 
Jeanne M. Kaiser1 
 
Abstract: Under federal law, state child protection agencies 
are required to exert ―reasonable efforts‖ to reunite abused and 
neglected children with their parents before seeking to 
terminate parental rights and free the children for adoption.  
The scope of this requirement is undefined in federal statutes 
and in the statutory law of many states.  As a result, it has 
fallen to appellate courts to determine the degree of effort a 
state agency must exert before the relationship between a 
parent and a child is severed. 
 
This has proven no easy task.  By the time a parental 
termination case has reached an appellate court, the children 
may have been in the care and protection of the state for a 
lengthy time and may have developed a bond with foster 
parents who are hoping to adopt them.  This leaves the 
appellate court with a difficult choice if it finds that the efforts 
of the state agency have been insufficient or poorly matched to 
the needs of the family in question. 
 
                                                                                                                        
 
1 The author is a member of the appellate panel of the Children and Family 
Law program of the Massachusetts Committee for Public Counsel Services.  She 
is also an Assistant Professor of Legal Research and Writing at Western New 
England College School of Law, where she teaches a class entitled Child, Family 
and State.  The author thanks her colleagues Beth Cohen, Giovanna Shay and 
Taylor Flynn for their comments on this piece.  The author owes a particular 
debt to the Legal Writing Institute‘s 2009 scholarship workshop for all the help 
she received as a participant. 
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Faced with these circumstances, many appellate courts 
have simply rubber-stamped the efforts of the state agency 
without much review, and in effect read the reasonable efforts 
requirement out of existence.  Other appellate courts have done 
a more exacting examination of whether reasonable efforts 
were made.  When these courts have found deficiencies, the 
almost inevitable effect has been to delay permanency for the 
children involved by requiring the agency to go back and make 
further attempts at reunification. 
 
After reviewing appellate decisions of both types, this 
article concludes that neither approach is satisfactory.  The 
article offers three ways to alleviate the thorny problems faced 
by appellate courts in these difficult cases.  First, it contends 
that in the absence of a federal definition of reasonable efforts, 
states should develop more precise definitions of their own.  
Second, it argues that courts make better use of empirical 
research when evaluating whether a state agency has made 
reasonable efforts, so as to make a more accurate assessment 
of whether the state‘s efforts are satisfactory.  Finally, it 
suggests that state courts discontinue the practice of 
considering reasonable efforts as a condition precedent to 
termination of parental rights. 
 
The article acknowledges that these approaches singly or in 
combination will not completely resolve the issues raised by 
reasonable efforts cases, but asserts they will help ease the 
problems created by those difficult cases. 
 
As an attorney who serves as appellate counsel for 
individuals in Massachusetts whose parental rights have been 
terminated, I have been quite surprised by the near universal 
failure of the ―reasonable efforts‖ defense to the termination of 
those rights.  In Massachusetts, as in almost every other state in 
the union,2 the state child protection agency is required to show 
that it used reasonable efforts, both to prevent the removal of 
                                                                                                                        
 
2 Will L. Crossley, Defining Reasonable Efforts: Demystifying the State‘s 
Burden Under Federal Child Protection Legislation, 12 B.U. PUB. INT‘L L.J. 259, 
293 & n.167 (2003). 
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children from their homes, and to reunite them with their 
families.3 
The reasonable efforts requirement is consistent with the 
basic underpinnings of care and protection law.  At the federal 
level, Congress requires states to use reasonable efforts to 
preserve families or forego federal funding for their child 
protection programs.4  In my own state, preservation of the 
biological family is cited as a fundamental purpose in the first 
section of the governing statute,5 and the state‘s departmental 
regulations require that it try to preserve the family unit in the 
course of carrying out its protective duties.6  In addition, there 
has long been a common law requirement in Massachusetts that 
the Department of Children and Families (the Department) 
establish that it tried to correct the conditions that led to its 
involvement before seeking to terminate parental rights.7  
Massachusetts, like a number of other states, codified the 
reasonable efforts requirement in 1984, in response to the 
federal mandate.8 
                                                                                                                        
 
3 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, §§ 26(b), 29C (2008). 
4 See infra note 21, and accompanying text; 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15). 
5 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 1 (2009).  The statute provides: 
It is hereby declared to be the policy of this commonwealth 
to direct its efforts, first, to the strengthening and 
encouragement of family life for the care and protection of 
children; to assist and encourage the use by any family of all 
available resources to this end; and to provide substitute care 
of children only when the family itself or the resources 
available to the family are unable to provide the necessary 
care and protection to insure [sic] the rights of any child to 
sound health and normal physical, mental, spiritual and 
moral development. 
Id. 
6 110 MASS. CODE REGS. 1.01 (2009) (explaining that the philosophy of the 
Department is to exert reasonable effort to keep families intact). 
7 In re Dep‘t of Pub. Welfare to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 381 
N.E.2d 565, 571 (Mass. 1978). 
8 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 29C (2008) (effective July 12, 1984).   
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In view of this legal landscape, I expected that the 
Department‘s efforts to keep children in their homes would be 
scrutinized carefully by appellate courts reviewing judgments 
terminating parental rights and/or placing children in the care 
and protection of the Department.  However, after repeatedly 
having little success with my own ―reasonable efforts‖ 
arguments on behalf of parents, I decided to explore the issue in 
more depth.  My exploration revealed a fundamental 
predicament for appellate courts reviewing reasonable efforts 
cases.  It is extraordinarily difficult to simultaneously hold the 
state to its obligation to use reasonable efforts to keep a family 
together and preserve permanency and stability for children. 
A review of appellate decisions on reasonable efforts revealed 
that cases are rarely overturned on the grounds that the state 
has not done enough to try to reunite parents with their 
children.  The practical reasons for this outcome are abundantly 
clear.  When the appellate court of any state reverses a decision 
of a trial court in a care and protection or adoption case it may 
also be reversing years of work to obtain permanency, safety, 
and emotional well-being for children who are parties to the 
case.  This is a hard path for an appellate court to take even 
when faced with lackluster, or downright hostile, attitudes 
towards reunification by the state.  In essence, courts are aware 
that a decision enforcing the state‘s obligation to comply with 
the law may also upset stability for a child who has been 
previously neglected or abused.  In such circumstances, courts 
may find it easier to rule that reasonable efforts need only mean 
meager or pro-forma efforts. 
Such a results-driven approach has its own substantial 
drawbacks.  If an appellate court always finds that the efforts 
made by the state are good enough, what motivation is there for 
the state to comply with its obligations in this regard?  Indeed, 
my observation is that many service plans developed for parents 
who have children in the Massachusetts child protection system 
have a decidedly perfunctory feel to them.  They routinely 
contain a mix of parenting classes, anger management 
workshops, and individual therapy, which when looked at in the 
context of the needs of the parents involved, appear to have little 
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to no chance of providing any actual help.9  Consistent judicial 
approval of these sorts of efforts certainly does little to 
encourage the state to exercise more creativity or vigor in 
carrying out its reunification efforts. 
Moreover, there are unfortunate secondary effects to this 
approach.  A judicial preference for preserving stability for 
children over enforcing the reasonable efforts requirement may 
benefit the children involved in a particular case, but be a 
detriment to children in state custody as a whole.  The 
reasonable efforts requirement is born out of a policy decision at 
both the state and federal level that children do best when raised 
by their family of origin and that the family unit should be 
preserved.10  Regular disregard of the reasonable efforts 
requirement, however well-intentioned or inadvertent, hardly 
furthers this goal.11 
This article explores the question of whether the goals of 
enforcing the reasonable efforts requirement and preserving 
stability for children can be reconciled.  Part I traces the origin 
of the reasonable efforts requirement in state and federal child 
protection law.  Part II.A examines state law cases, of which 
Massachusetts is a typical example, that have elevated concerns 
about permanency for children over rigorous enforcement of the 
requirement.  Part II.B examines decisions from other 
jurisdictions that have held the state to a higher standard, while 
at the same time creating an unacceptably high risk to the 
children involved.  Finally, Part III investigates some 
approaches that might alleviate, although not completely 
                                                                                                                        
 
9 See Crossley, supra note 2, at 305 (criticizing the use of ―boilerplate‖ 
service plans ―unrelated to the conditions that gave rise to intervention‖). 
10 This is not an unsubstantiated concern.  There is significant evidence that 
separating children from their families, even when the families have significant 
defects, can be psychologically devastating to the children. Nell Clement, Note, 
Do ―Reasonable Efforts‖ Require Cultural Competence? The Importance of 
Culturally Competent Reunification Services in the California Child Welfare 
System, 5 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L. J. 397, 418-19 & nn.135-42 (2008). 
11 Indeed, one author has concluded that the law governing reasonable 
efforts is a ―hollow requirement‖ and a ―dead letter.‖  Crossley, supra note 2, at 
312.  
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resolve, the clash between enforcement of the reasonable efforts 
requirement and preserving stability and safety for children. 
I. ORIGIN OF THE REASONABLE EFFORTS 
REQUIREMENT 
There has long been a tension between whether the natural 
family or substitute caretakers are the best way to care for 
abused and neglected children.  At times, child protection 
experts have taken the position that children should be 
permanently severed from abusive and neglectful homes and 
placed with new families without much regard for the children‘s 
biological parents.12  However, this approach is not only 
controversial on child development and child psychology 
grounds, it has constitutional problems.  The routine or 
automatic removal of children from their families cannot meet 
constitutional standards set forth in a series of United States 
Supreme Court cases.  These cases hold that parents have a 
constitutional right to raise their children as they see fit without 
interference from the state.13  This right was specifically applied 
to the care and protection setting in 1982 when the Court 
decided Santosky v. Kramer.14  There, the Court determined 
that the state could not terminate parental rights without a 
finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parent was 
unfit.15 
Nonetheless, this right is tempered by the state‘s parens 
patriae interest in protecting the health and welfare of 
                                                                                                                        
 
12 Robert F. Kelly, New Perspectives on Child Protection, Family 
Preservation and Reunification Programs in Child Protection Cases: 
Effectiveness, Best Practices, and Implications for Legal Representation, 
Judicial Practice, and Public Policy, 34 FAM. L. Q. 359, 359 (2000). 
13 See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc‘y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (stating 
that parents have constitutional liberty interest in choosing to enroll child in 
parochial school); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (identifying 
liberty interest in child-rearing choices).   
14 455 U.S. 745 (1982). 
15 Id. at 769. 
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children.16  At times, the prevailing view has been that it is best 
to freely exercise this power to separate children from allegedly 
unfit parents as quickly and cleanly as possible.  At other times, 
the pendulum has swung in the opposite direction.17  At these 
times, child protection experts have been more concerned about 
the problems inherent in separating children from not just the 
biological parents they love, but their communities, and perhaps 
their racial, ethnic or religious identities as well, and 
consequently fought to keep families together.18  Unfortunately, 
these efforts sometimes resulted in children returning, time and 
again, to parents who were utterly incapable of caring for them 
safely.19  At other times, it led to ―foster care drift,‖ wherein the 
child would be placed with a series of foster families in lieu of a 
                                                                                                                        
 
16 Id. at 766-67. 
17 See Patricia A. Schene, Past, Present, and Future Roles of Child 
Protective Services, 8:1 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN, 23 (1988), available at 
http://www.princeton.edu/futureofchildren/publications/docs/08_01_FullJou
rnal.pdf.  Schene asserts that this battle has been going on for a long time.  She 
writes: 
The history of the nation‘s response to child abuse and 
neglect has been marked by a tension between two missions: 
an emphasis on rescuing children from abusive or neglectful 
families on the one hand, and efforts to support and preserve 
their families on the other. The contemporary debate over 
the priority given to these competing goals, waged in the 
press and in scholarly journals, is actually more than 100 
years old. 
Id. at 24 (citation omitted). 
18 See Kelly, supra note 12, at 359; see also Clement, supra note 10, at 418 
(focusing on the problems created by separating children from their 
backgrounds contending, ―[r]emoval of children from their families and cultural 
community has potentially devastating effects on the identity and psychological 
health of the removed children.‖). 
19 See Michele Ingrassia & John McCormick, Why Leave Children with Bad 
Parents?, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 25, 1994, at 52 (outlining a series of what the 
authors viewed as egregious errors by child welfare officials who left children 
with their families with disastrous consequences).  See generally Elizabeth 
Bartholet, NOBODY‘S CHILDREN: ABUSE AND NEGLECT, FOSTER DRIFT, AND THE 
ADOPTION ALTERNATIVE (1999). 
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pre-adoptive family who would be willing to care for the child 
permanently.20 
The competing fears about each end of the separation-
reunification spectrum serve as background to the reasonable 
efforts requirement.  First, the concern about separating 
children from their biological parents too precipitously led 
states to require reunification efforts in their common-law 
decisions and then eventually to codification in federal child 
welfare statutes.  However, by limiting the state‘s responsibility 
to exerting only ―reasonable‖ efforts, the government addressed 
concerns about foster care drift and lack of permanence for 
children that can result from parents being given multiple 
―second‖ chances. 
While many states already had common-law or statutory 
requirements that child protective agencies attempt to keep 
families together, the reasonable efforts requirement was first 
included in federal law in 1980.21  The Adoption Assistance and 
Child Welfare Act (AACWA) required states to exercise 
reasonable efforts at points in the child protection process.  
Specifically, the AACWA required that ―in each case, reasonable 
efforts will be made (A) prior to the placement of a child in 
foster care, to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the 
child from his home, and (B) to make it possible for the child to 
return to his home.‖22  Thus, under the statute, reasonable 
efforts were required first to prevent a child‘s removal from the 
home and then to make it possible for him or her to return 
home.23 
                                                                                                                        
 
20 Bartholet, supra note 19, at 241.  
21 Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, § 
101(a)(1), 94 Stat. 500, 503 (1980).  This provision of the reasonable efforts 
requirement was preserved when Congress enacted the Adoption and Safe 
Families Act in 1997.  See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B) (2009). 
22 Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 
671(a)(15). 
23 The reasonable efforts requirement, along with other provisions of the 
AACWA, was intended to eliminate the unintended consequence of promoting 
foster care placement that resulted from previous federal legislation.  Under the 
previous legislation, states received federal reimbursement for foster care 
placements, but not federal financial aid for providing reunification or adoption 
services.  The AACWA, thus transformed the federal role from a ―relatively 
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One goal of the AACWA was to discourage states from 
looking at removal of children from their homes as both a first 
and last resort.  The legislation instead sought to encourage 
states to provide families with the services they needed to 
remain intact and functional.24  One likely motivation for this 
goal was the explosion in foster care placements, which rose 
from 8,000 to 100,000 during the ten-year period prior to 
enactment of the AACWA.25 
However laudable this goal, following the enactment of the 
AACWA, the pendulum swung away from the goal of family 
reunification back to the goals of achieving permanency and 
avoiding foster care drift.  At least one commentator posits that 
the primary reason for the swing was a series of high profile 
news reports of horrific child abuse that rightly or wrongly were 
blamed in part on the reasonable efforts requirement of the 
AACWA.26  As a consequence, the reasonable efforts 
requirement was limited in the Adoption and Safe Families Act 
of 1997 (ASFA).27  Perhaps the most fundamental change was 
                                                                                                                        
simple bill payment for foster care into a system of requirements that 
encouraged states to focus on services aimed at preserving families and 
achieving permanency for children.‖  Crossley, supra note 2, at 270. 
24 See Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 § 103, 94 Stat. at 
519 (codified at 42 U.S. C. § 625(a)(1) (2006)) (enumerating ―preventing the 
unnecessary separation of children from their families by identifying family 
problems, assisting families in resolving their problems, and preventing 
breakup of the family where the prevention of child removal is desirable and 
possible‖ as one of the purposes of child welfare programs). 
25 See Shawn L. Raymond, Where Are the Reasonable Efforts to Enforce 
the Reasonable Efforts Requirement?: Monitoring State Compliance Under the 
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1235, 1235 
(1999).  
26 Crossley, supra note 2, at 273-82.  According to Crossley, the vagueness 
of the reasonable efforts requirement in the AACWA led child protection 
caseworkers to believe that their hands were tied when faced with parents who 
endangered their children.  Id. at 273-78.  See also Cristine H. Kim, Note, 
Putting Reason Back into the Reasonable Efforts Requirement in Child Abuse 
and Neglect Cases, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 287, 294-96 (placing the blame for a 
number of appalling child abuse and neglect cases on the AACWA; calling them 
―reunification murders‖) (citations omitted). 
27 Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 
(1997) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).    
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that the legislation provided that the child‘s ―health and safety‖ 
are the ―paramount concern‖ for a judge determining whether 
reasonable efforts had been made.28  Thus, for the first time, the 
question of whether the state had utilized reasonable efforts was 
explicitly linked to the child‘s safety.  Given this new emphasis, 
states might well feel free to be less aggressive with the services 
they offer to families, knowing that the primary consideration 
for a judge will be not the strength of their efforts, but the health 
and safety of the child.29 
In addition, under the ASFA, states did not have to exercise 
reasonable efforts to keep children in their homes when certain 
enumerated conditions were met.30  The ASFA also enacted 
timetables governing how long a child could be in foster care 
before the state was required to file a petition for termination of 
parental rights.31  In these ways, Congress tacitly limited the 
amount of time state child welfare agencies were required to 
dedicate to trying to preserve the family.32 
                                                                                                                        
 
28 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(A) (2009). 
29 The evidence is that this indeed has been the case at least with regard to 
incorporating this standard into statutory law.  According to one author, two-
thirds of the states have incorporated into their child protection statutes the 
paramount nature of the health and safety of the child in the calculation of 
whether reasonable efforts have been made.  See Crossley, supra note 2, at 294.   
30 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D).  The ASFA excuses reasonable efforts when the 
parents‘ behavior has been particularly deplorable.  These circumstances 
include when (1) the child has been abandoned; (2) the parental rights were 
involuntarily terminated (3) the parent has been convicted of murder or 
voluntary manslaughter of another of their children or aiding or abetting in that 
crime; (4) the parent has been convicted of assault or another crime that results 
in serious injury to the child or another of parent‘s children; (5) the parent has 
subjected the child to aggravating circumstances including the murder of 
another parent in front of the child, subjecting the child or other children in the 
home to sexual abuse or other conduct of a severe and repetitive nature that 
subjects the child to physical or emotional abuse.  Id. 
31 42 U.S.C. § 671 (5)(C). 
32 Although the ASFA significantly modified the reasonable efforts 
requirement, its effect on the states is uncertain.  Crossley noted that many state 
statutes appear to be emphasizing child safety and permanency while 
deemphasizing reunification services in the wake of the ASFA.  Crossley, supra  
note 2, at 294.  Furthermore, another commentator views the ASFA as changing 
a presumption that reunification is in the best interests of the child to a 
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A number of factors have led to uneven treatment of the 
reasonable efforts requirement in the states.  First, neither the 
AACWA nor the ASFA defined the reasonable efforts 
requirement.  Second, under both statutes, the penalty to states 
for failure to comply with the requirement is to risk losing 
federal matching funds for their child protection programs.33  
This has proven to be an idle threat.  Strict monitoring of 
compliance and denial of matching funds has rarely, if ever, 
occurred.34  Finally, the United States Supreme Court has 
determined there is no private right of action to enforce the 
reasonable efforts requirement.35  The combination of these 
factors means that states can essentially enforce the reasonable 
efforts requirement as rigorously or as loosely as they see fit.36 
                                                                                                                        
presumption that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the 
child if reunification cannot be accomplished within fifteen months.  See 
Clement, supra note 10, at 397. 
On the other hand, according to another commentator, most state courts 
did not vary their approach to the interpretation of the reasonable efforts 
requirement after the ASFA was passed.  See Kathleen S. Bean, Reasonable 
Efforts: What State Courts Think, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 321, 324 (2005).  I have 
noted that neither the AACWA nor the ASFA is mentioned in Massachusetts 
cases with any frequency, nor is there any indication in its judicial decisions that 
the change in the federal law has effected a change in the view of what 
constitutes reasonable efforts under Massachusetts law. 
33 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15). 
34 See generally Raymond, supra note 25.  See also Crossley, supra note 2, 
at 286-87 (commenting that federal funding is rarely withheld, leaving states to 
enforce the reasonable efforts requirement in any way they choose). 
35 Suter v. Artist, 503 U.S. 347, 364 (1992). 
36 State practices, at least to some extent, encourage a loose approach.  
Many states have pre-printed forms where judges can simply check off a box to 
fulfill their obligations to certify that reasonable efforts were made to prevent 
removal.  Crossley, supra note 2, at 285.  As Crossley notes, ―[c]hecking a box 
on a pre-printed form . . . does not foster a hearing conducive to the 
individualized determinations that [the statute] had contemplated.‖  Id. 
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II. THE THORNY PROBLEM OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
OF THE REASONABLE EFFORTS REQUIREMENT 
IN THE STATE COURTS 
A. LOOSE ENFORCEMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT 
Massachusetts serves as one example of a state in which 
judicial enforcement of the reasonable efforts requirement has 
been forgiving of uninspired state efforts.  At first glance, this is 
an unexpected result.  Although neither the ACCWA nor the 
ASFA required states to incorporate the reasonable efforts 
requirement into their statutory law,37 Massachusetts was one of 
the states that chose to integrate the language of the federal 
statute into its own child protection scheme.38  By adopting the 
federal language as its own, the Massachusetts legislature 
apparently intended to impose an obligation that can be relied 
upon by parents and children aggrieved of the state‘s efforts in 
its child protection system.  This was not really a substantial 
change in the law; common-law decisions in Massachusetts had 
consistently cited the need for the Department to work with 
parents towards reunification before termination of parental 
rights could take place.39 
However, Massachusetts appellate courts have set the bar for 
complying with the reasonable efforts requirement quite low, 
rarely deciding that the state has not met its obligation.40  
                                                                                                                        
 
37 42 U.S.C § 671(a).  
38 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, §§ 24, 29C (2008).  In addition to these 
explicit references to the reasonable efforts requirement, the Massachusetts 
statute governing termination of parental rights essentially incorporates the 
reasonable efforts requirement when setting forth the circumstances the court 
must consider when terminating parental rights.  See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 210, 
§ 3(c) (2008). 
39 See In re Dep‘t of Pub. Welfare to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 
381 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 1978). 
40 Massachusetts appellate cases reversing judgments against parents on 
the basis of failure to exercise reasonable efforts are difficult to find.  In one 
case, the Massachusetts Appeals Court reversed a judgment terminating a 
father‘s parental rights in part because the Department had done little to help 
the father find appropriate housing for him to care for the children.  In re 
Elaine, 764 N.E.2d 917, 922 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002).  The court found that the 
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Viewed from a results-oriented perspective, the advantages of 
this approach are clear.  By the time a parent‘s rights are 
terminated, a child may have been in foster care or a pre-
adoptive home for many months, if not years.  The children may 
well have a stronger bond with the substitute caretaker by this 
point than they have with their biological parents.  Moreover, it 
may appear to an appellate court that the biological parents in 
question are so impaired by drugs, disability, violent disposition 
or character flaws that no amount of effort by the state agency is 
likely to make a sizeable difference in their ability to care for 
their children. 
Compounding the problem, an appellate court faced with a 
lackluster effort to preserve the family by the state agency has 
only unattractive options at its disposal.  It could reverse the 
judgment of termination and remand to the trial court, 
essentially giving both the agency and the biological parents 
another opportunity to make the family work.  However, taking 
this option could wreak disaster on the life of a young child.  The 
child might be separated from foster parents with whom he or 
she has a warm attachment.  Pre-adoptive families may decide 
they are not patient or flexible enough to put their plans on hold 
until the child‘s family falls apart again.  Most worrying, the 
child may be subjected to additional abuse or neglect despite the 
best efforts of the state agency. 
Given all of this, the lax enforcement of the reasonable 
efforts requirement by the Massachusetts courts is both 
practical and predictable.  However, a review of Massachusetts 
appellate decisions related to the reasonable efforts requirement 
                                                                                                                        
Department‘s efforts, which amounted to giving the father ―a list of places to 
call,‖ were insufficient, especially given that it did not contact him until several 
days before filing a petition to terminate his parental rights.  Id.  However, in 
this case, there was very little evidence of the father‘s unfitness to uphold the 
judgment of termination, no matter what the Department‘s efforts.  In an 
unpublished decision, the Appeals Court considered reasonable efforts to be a 
factor when it reversed a judgment of termination.  In re Talbot, No. 01-P-1831, 
2002 WL 31455226, at *2 (Mass App. Ct. Nov. 4, 2002).  In that case, the court 
reversed because the trial judge relied on stale information and because the 
Department offered the mother a ―paucity of services‖ in the face of her 
repeated requests for help from the Department.  Id. at *1.  Beyond these two 
cases, there do not appear to be instances where a judgment of termination was 
overturned by an appellate court on the ground that the Department did not use 
reasonable efforts to reunify the family.  
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reveals an essential lack of connection between what the court 
says is the law and what the court is willing to enforce as the 
law.  Massachusetts appellate decisions continually stress that 
heroic efforts to preserve the family are not required.41  This 
raises no concern; state and federal statutes only require a 
reasonable effort.  What does raise a concern is the amount of 
effort that the appellate courts are willing to view as reasonable.  
The appellate courts have often excused decidedly non-heroic 
efforts by the Department as good enough to meet its standards, 
especially when a failure to so find would undo the placement of 
the child. 
For instance, in Adoption of Gregory,42 one of the first post-
AACWA cases to address the reasonable efforts requirement, the 
state, working through a private agency, could hardly have done 
less to reunify the family in question.  It made no efforts 
whatsoever to reunite the children with their parents for the first 
twenty months after they were removed from their custody.43  
Thereafter, it informed the institution where the children had 
been placed that reunification with the parents was a possibility 
and that therefore the facility should try to work with them.44  At 
that point, the institution set up meetings with the parents to 
discuss their parenting problems, encouraged them to 
participate in services in the community and set up a visitation 
schedule.  The agency‘s own efforts were limited to drawing up a 
service plan for the parents that identified the tasks the parents 
needed to complete before reunification could occur.45 
Despite these sparse efforts by the agency, the Massachusetts 
Appeals Court gave short shrift to the parents‘ argument that the 
Department failed to work to reunify them with the children.  
The court‘s direct discussion of reasonable efforts was relegated 
                                                                                                                        
 
41 See, e.g., Adoption of Lenore, 770 N.E.2d 498, 503 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002); 
Adoption of Abigail, 499 N.E.2d 1234, 1238 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986).  
42 See 501 N.E.2d 1179 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986). 
43 Id. at 1180-81. 
44 Id. at 1181. 
45 Id. 
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to a short paragraph at the end of the decision.46  There, the 
court made clear its view that it was the parents‘ failings, and 
not the Department‘s, that made reunification impossible, 
noting that the parents did not consistently take advantage of 
those services that were offered.47  More tellingly, the court 
focused on the children‘s fragile emotional state and their bond 
with pre-adoptive parents in deciding to uphold the decision to 
terminate parental rights.48  The court determined that while 
the Department may have failed to follow its own regulations, 
―the breach was not such as to call for a present remedy,‖49 thus 
indicating that it was far more concerned with the practical 
result of a reversal of the termination decision on the children 
than whether the Department fulfilled its statutory obligation to 
use reasonable efforts to reunify.50 
The Appeals Court has also consistently excused the 
Department from making any effort to preserve the family when 
a post-hoc examination of the case permits the conclusion that 
                                                                                                                        
 
46 Id. at 1186.  The parents premised their claim on chapter 119, section 1 of 
the General Laws of Massachusetts which stresses the goal of ―strengthening 
and encouragement of family life,‖ as well as regulations that required the 
Department to develop service plans for the parents.  Id. 
47 Adoption of Gregory, 501 N.E.2d at 1186. 
48 Id. at 1183. 
49 Id. at 1186. 
50 Other jurisdictions have taken a similar approach when faced with 
desultory efforts by their state child protection agency.  For instance, the New 
Mexico Appeals Court expressed concern that despite all parties‘ agreement that 
a mother should obtain an evaluation that would permit her to receive a referral 
to parent-child therapy that was deemed necessary to reunification, she was 
unable to obtain the expert evaluation she needed to obtain a therapy referral.  
State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep‘t, 47 P.3d 859 (N.M. Ct. App. 
2002).  In that case, the court commented that the state agency ―simply let 
events take their course‖ until ―time became an insurmountable obstacle‖ for 
the mother and termination of her parental rights was inevitable.  Id. at 866.  
The court remarked that it was ―troubled‖ by the state agency‘s actions and that 
it believed the state ―agency [could not] be proud‖ of its actions, but found the 
reasonable efforts requirement was ―barely satisfied‖ and upheld the judgment 
of termination.  Id. 
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any efforts would have been futile.51  In Adoption of Nicole, for 
instance, the court acknowledged that ―it is fair comment that 
the [agency charged with working with the father] did not do 
much for the father, but it is equally fair comment that [the 
agency] had little with which to work.‖52  The court ruled that 
because the father was going to be incarcerated for a lengthy 
period of time, the Department did not have to ―go through the 
motions‖ of providing reunification services when it had already 
settled on the plan of adoption.53  The court also noted 
―parenthetically‖ that it was unwilling to penalize the child 
involved in the case because of mistakes made by the 
Department.54  Thus, in this case, the Appeals Court signaled its 
view that if forced to choose between strict enforcement of the 
reasonable efforts requirement and preserving the placement of 
the child, it would choose the latter course. 
                                                                                                                        
 
51 Massachusetts courts are far from alone in deciding that the state does 
not have to make efforts to reunify if those efforts are likely to be futile.  See 
Bean, supra note 32, at 337-43 (positing that the proliferation of cases finding 
that a state agency does not have to go through the motions of attempting to 
reunify if such efforts are likely to be fruitless is related to the more constricted 
view of reasonable efforts contained in the ASFA).  However, at least in 
Massachusetts, the futility defense to a reasonable efforts challenge predates the 
AFSA.  See Adoption of Nicole, 662 N.E.2d 1058, 1061 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996). 
52 662 N.E.2d at 1061. 
53 Id. at 1062.  See also Adoption of Abigail, 499 N.E.2d 1234, 1238 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 1986) (finding that ―it would have required a high and unreasonable 
measure of optimism‖ for the Department to create a specific plan to reunite a 
daughter with her mentally retarded mother).  The child in Adoption of Abigail 
was removed from her mother‘s care sixteen days after her birth.  The court 
found that the Department fulfilled its obligation to attempt to reunify the 
family by allowing the mother to visit the child after the removal.  Id.  The court 
further found that even though there were signs that the mother had made 
significant progress in defeating her personal problems in the time between her 
daughter‘s birth and the trial, the mother would be unable to meet the special 
needs of her child and thus termination of her rights was appropriate.  Id. at 
1237.  Of note in this case is that the child had been placed with a foster family 
as a newborn and remained with them for the three and one-half years that it 
took for the case to move through trial and appeal.  Id. at 1235.  Thus, the court 
was indirectly posed with the question of whether it should delay and possibly 
disrupt adoption of a child who had been with the prospective adoptive parents 
since she was a new-born. 
54 Adoption of Nicole, 662 N.E.2d at 1062. 
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The Appeals Court has also made it clear that the 
Department‘s efforts are limited to linking parents to existing 
services and that it is not required to fill the gaps in available 
services on its own.55  In fact, the Department is not even 
required to look very hard for available services and instead can 
rely on an expert opinion asserting that there are no services 
that would fill a particular need of a parent.56 
The Appeals Court has been similarly tolerant of 
reunification efforts by the Department that are so poorly 
matched to the parent in question as to raise a judicial 
eyebrow.57  For instance, in Adoption of Adam, the court 
acknowledged that it was ―unusual‖ for a Department case 
worker to serve as a ―therapist‖ for a mother seeking 
reunification with her son.58  The court nonetheless found that 
this service was reasonable because the case worker labored 
diligently to help the mother for three years and the mother 
found the contact to be beneficial.59  The court did not comment 
                                                                                                                        
 
55 See Adoption of Lenore, 770 N.E.2d 498, 503 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002).  In 
Lenore, the Department referred the parents to a number of services, but their 
applications to receive them were rejected.  Id. 
56 Id.  In Lenore, the Appeals Court chided the Department for relying on 
the expert‘s testimony that no services were available that would help the 
parents to raise their child, rather than investigating the availability of services 
itself.  The court noted that the Department has the expertise to match parents 
and services and that it is obligated to use that expertise and urged that the trial 
court must remain ―vigilant‖ in assuring that the Department fulfilled its 
obligations.  Id. at 503 & n.3.  Nonetheless, other than this mild rebuke in the 
footnote to a published decision, the Department suffered no consequence for 
its failure to use its expertise. 
57 A good example of this attitude by the Appeals Court is contained in the 
unpublished decision Adoption of Madison, No. 05-P-390, 2005 WL 2861460, 
at *1 (Mass. App. Ct. Nov. 1, 2005).  There, the court remarked in a footnote that 
―this was not the Department‘s finest hour.‖  Id. at *4 n.5.  This was something 
of an understatement.  Despite the fact that the Department had been involved 
with a very needy family for many years, it did not enter a single service plan 
that would have established its efforts to preserve the family into the record.  Id.  
Although clearly disturbed by this apparent failure to fulfill its statutory 
obligation, the court found that the Department‘s efforts were reasonable 
because the parents had rejected some of the services offered.  Id. at *4. 
58 Adoption of Adam, 500 N.E.2d. 816, 819 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986). 
59 Id. 
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on the fact that the evidence strongly indicated that serious 
psychological problems were the source of the mother‘s 
difficulties in raising her son and that generally a Department 
case worker will not have the same qualifications or skills as a 
trained psychotherapist to deal effectively with these problems.  
It also failed to note the possibility that the Department‘s case 
worker may well have had an adverse interest to the mother, 
given that the Department favored adoption over reunification 
as a plan for the child.  Indeed, it is hard to see how using such a 
poorly matched resource to provide the crucial reunification 
service in a particular case could possibly be viewed as a 
―reasonable‖ way to effect reunification.60 
But perhaps the most potent means the Appeals Court has 
used to dispose of the reasonable efforts requirement is to 
routinely hold that the Department‘s obligation to offer services 
is contingent on the parents fulfilling their own obligations to 
work towards reunification.61  In these cases, the court‘s 
discussion has focused on the unreasonableness of the parents‘ 
efforts as opposed to an evaluation of whether the Department 
has acted reasonably.62  Whatever the initial appeal of this 
                                                                                                                        
 
60 For an example of similar acceptance of poorly matched services in 
another jurisdiction, see In re Charles A., 738 A.2d 222 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999).  
In this case, the trial court had heavily criticized the state Department of 
Children and Families for failing to recognize that the mother was not abusing 
her children, but rather, like the children, was a victim of her husband‘s abuse.  
The trial court found that the department had violated its own regulations with 
regard to the mother‘s situation and even took some responsibility upon itself 
for failing to appoint separate counsel to represent the mother.  Id. at 223.  
Nonetheless, the trial court found that the mother had refused some of services 
proffered by the department and that therefore reasonable efforts to reunify her 
with the children were made.  Id. at 224. The Appeals Court upheld this 
determination.  Id. 
61 See, e.g., Adoption of Mario, 686 N.E.2d 1061 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997); 
Adoption of Serge, 750 N.E.2d 498 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001); Adoption of Eduardo, 
782 N.E.2d. 551 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003).  Other states also judge the state‘s 
efforts in conjunction with the parents‘ efforts or lack thereof.  See, e.g., In re 
Guardianship of D.M.H., 736 A.2d 1261, 1274 (N.J. 1999); In re Jason L., 810 
A.2d 765, 767 (R.I. 2002); In re M.B., 595 N.W.2d 815, 818 (Iowa Ct. App. 
1999). 
62 See, e.g., Adoption of Mario, 686 N.E.2d. at 1066; Adoption of Serge, 750 
N.E.2d. at 504. 
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approach, there are at least two problems with its application.  
First, nothing in the Massachusetts statutes governing 
reasonable efforts, or the federal law those statutes are modeled 
upon, suggests that the Department‘s obligation is excused if the 
parents do not show initiative themselves.  Thus, the Appeals 
Court interpretation creates an exception to the reasonable 
efforts requirement that is absent from the plain language of the 
statute. 
Perhaps more importantly, this approach ignores a 
fundamental aspect of care and protection cases in general and 
the reasonable efforts requirement in particular.  The cases 
excusing the Department‘s responsibilities on the ground that 
the parents have not fulfilled their own obligations catalogue the 
failings of the parents in great detail.  The average reader, upon 
reviewing this litany of parental failures, might well determine 
that the parents have forfeited all right to services offered by the 
Department because of their bad behavior.  However, this 
ignores that the Department‘s very existence is premised on the 
assumption that it will deal with dysfunctional, disturbed 
and/or irresponsible parents.  Thus, it seems only fair that the 
reasonable efforts requirement be tailored to meet the 
propensities of those parents, and not those of the average, 
responsible parent who might be expected to eagerly accept 
available services.  In short, the clientele served by the 
Department would seem to need extra measures of outreach, 
patience and aggressiveness to successfully link to services.  In 
view of this dynamic, excusing the Department from any 
obligation at all if the parents do not show initiative in engaging 
in services is both counter-intuitive and unfairly shifts the 
burden to the parents.63 
This unfairness is particularly problematic when parents 
suffer from a disability such as mental illness or mental 
retardation.  The decisions of the Massachusetts appellate courts 
                                                                                                                        
 
63 Some states have noted this problem in reviewing their own reasonable 
efforts cases.  The Connecticut Appellate Court, for instance, quoted New York‘s 
highest court with approval, stating ―the parent is by definition saddled with 
problems: economic, physical, sociological, psychiatric or any combination 
thereof.  The agency, in contrast, is vested with expertise, experience, capital, 
manpower and prestige.‖  In re Eden F., 710 A.2d 771, 783 (Conn. App. Ct. 
1998) (quoting In re Sheila G., 462 N.E.2d 1139, 1145 (N.Y. 1984)). 
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send a contradictory message on what constitutes reasonable 
efforts in these cases.  On the one hand, these decisions have 
stressed that the Department has an obligation to tailor services 
in order to accommodate the disabilities of parents.64  On the 
other hand, no decision has ever found that the Department 
failed to fulfill this obligation, no matter what the nature or 
severity of the disability involved. 65 
This is perhaps most problematic when a parent suffers from 
a mental illness.  Parents suffering from a serious mental illness 
such as schizophrenia or bi-polar disorder present a particular 
conundrum with regard to reunification services.  One of the 
hallmarks of serious mental illness is denial that any problem 
exists.  Oftentimes, people suffering from schizophrenia, for 
example, will be extremely paranoid and delusional while at the 
same time vociferously denying that there is anything wrong 
with them or that medication is required.  Nevertheless, when a 
mentally ill parent refuses a Department recommended 
psychiatric evaluation or prescribed medication, on the ground 
that nothing is wrong with them, the Appeals Court has 
generally found that the Department has fulfilled its reasonable 
efforts obligation simply by making those services available.66  
Moreover, the Appeals Court has found that a parent who 
declined those services on the ground she did not need them has 
                                                                                                                        
 
64 See, e.g., Adoption of Gregory, 747 N.E.2d 120, 126 (Mass. 2001) 
(reiterating earlier decisions that the Department was required to accommodate 
a parent‘s disabilities in provision of services, but held that the American with 
Disabilities Act, as codified in 42 U.S.C. § 12131, cannot be used as a defense in 
termination of parental rights proceedings). 
65 In Adoption of Gregory, the Supreme Judicial Court found that the 
Department sufficiently accommodated a father with cognitive disabilities by 
revising its visitation schedule, continuing to use a social worker trained in 
cognitive deficits to work with the father beyond the investigation stage, and 
referring the parents to a parenting group designed to work with cognitively 
limited parents.  Id. 
66 Not all states require that their child protection agencies exert reasonable 
efforts to reunite parents suffering from a mental illness with their children.  
Indeed, several states have statutes that explicitly exempt the state from this 
requirement upon a showing that the parent has a mental disability.  See Dale 
Margolin, No Chance to Prove Themselves: The Rights of Mentally Disabled 
Parents Under the Americans with Disabilities Act and State Law, 15 VA. J. 
SOC. POL‘Y & L. 112 (2007). 
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waived her claim that the Department failed to accommodate 
her disability by not raising the claim at the very time she 
refused the services. 67  In essence, such a holding places the 
responsibility for recognizing and accepting help for a mental 
illness on the parent at the very time the parent is clinically the 
least likely to do so.  This practice hardly accommodates the 
disability.  To the contrary, it treats the disability as if it did not 
exist and as if the mentally ill parent was equally capable of 
taking advantage of services as a parent not so impaired. 
In short, at every juncture, the Massachusetts courts have 
taken an approach to the reasonable efforts requirement that 
minimizes the obligations of the Department and maximizes the 
need for difficult and impaired parents to take responsibility for 
resolving their own parenting problems before they can attain 
reunification with their children.  Ultimately, the reason for this 
approach appears to be the principle first stated in Adoption of 
Gregory, that the failure to exert reasonable efforts is a breach 
for which there is no ―present remedy‖68 and the ―parenthetical‖ 
comment in Adoption of Nicole,69 that the court would not allow 
the children involved to be penalized because of the deficiencies 
of the Department.  In essence, by holding the Department to a 
minimal standard, the courts can preserve the placements of the 
children of parents who may have been poorly served.  
Nonetheless, while it is quite problematic for a state‘s appellate 
courts to systematically minimize, or even ignore, the 
requirements of state statutory law, along with federal 
mandates, the potentially tragic consequences of a more 
rigorous approach to the reasonable efforts requirement 
approach are easy to see when reviewing decisions from other 
states. 
                                                                                                                        
 
67 See, e.g., Adoption of Eduardo, 782 N.E.2d 551, 555 (Mass. App. Ct. 
2003). 
68 See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text. 
69 See supra note 54. 
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B. STRICT ENFORCEMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT 
A number of states have applied more exacting standards in 
reasonable efforts cases at various points in the past.  As a 
consequence, the outcomes in those decisions are sometimes 
starkly different from those in Massachusetts.  For example, in 
California, the standard the state must satisfy is by design more 
stringent.  The California parental rights termination statute 
requires the state to prove by clear and convincing evidence that 
it has used reasonable efforts to reunify the family before it will 
permit termination of parental rights.70  One example of a 
reasonable efforts case from California suffices to illustrate how 
this more stringent standard can have radically different 
consequences in the life of a family. 
In In re Victoria M.,71 the California Court of Appeal 
reversed a judgment terminating the parental rights of a mother 
in the following circumstances.  The mother had seven children, 
none of whom were in her care at the time of the hearing on this 
matter.72  The case arose when the mother and three of her 
children, two girls and a boy, were about to be evicted from a 
motel.  All of the children had head lice so severe that their 
heads needed to be shaved and the two girls had scabies.  The 
boy had suffered an accidental burn that needed to be treated by 
a skin graft.  The donor site for the skin graft had become so 
infected due to inadequate care that the skin grew over the 
bandage and his ―trousers had to be peeled off‖ to treat the 
infection.73 
                                                                                                                        
 
70 CAL. WELF & INST. CODE § 361.5(b) (West 2008).  Connecticut has a 
similar requirement of clear and convincing evidence.  Crossley, supra note 2, at 
301 nn.210-11.  This is a requirement these states have imposed upon 
themselves.  Proof by clear and convincing evidence of a parent‘s unfitness is 
constitutionally required.  Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769.  However, most states 
have not required that same burden of proof with regard to the reasonable 
efforts requirement.  The Massachusetts courts have not spoken to the burden 
of proof with regard to reasonable efforts. 
71 255 Cal. Rptr. 498 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). 
72 Id. at 500. 
73 Id. 
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The mother was mentally retarded and had a poor history 
with social service providers.  In fact, one agency refused to 
work with her anymore because of her excessive use of 
services.74  After the children were removed from her care, the 
mother was instructed to participate in numerous services and 
to meet certain goals such as obtaining appropriate housing and 
acting appropriately during visitation.75  Although the mother 
actively participated in most of the services offered to her; 
because of her borderline IQ, she had difficulty benefitting from 
the services.  The service providers uniformly proffered a poor 
prognosis for her ability to adequately parent the children.76  
She visited with the children regularly, although not as often as 
her service plan allowed.  Furthermore, during the visits she had 
difficulty controlling all three children at the same time and the 
arrangements had to be revised so she could visit with the boy 
alone.  At the time of the appellate decision, the girls, who had 
been in state custody for three years, were living with foster 
parents who were willing to adopt them.  The prognosis for the 
boy was bleaker.  Service providers predicted he would need 
institutional care because of his own disabilities.77 
On appeal, the California court accepted the mother‘s 
argument that the state did not prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that it had made reasonable efforts to reunify her with 
her children.  The court found that the services offered were not 
specifically tailored to address the mother‘s limited intellectual 
abilities.78  The court also criticized the state for not being more 
proactive in its efforts to assist the mother in obtaining housing, 
and expecting instead that the mother find housing on her very 
limited income by herself.79  The court reached this conclusion 
even though the mother‘s counselor in her parenting class 
                                                                                                                        
 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 501. 
77 In re Victoria M., 255 Cal. Rptr. 498, 501 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). 
78 Id. at 504-05. 
79 Id. at 504. 
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recognized her limitations but found that she was unable, even 
after three attempts, to understand the material in the classes or 
integrate them into her parenting style.  The court was also 
unimpressed that the mother eventually became a client at an 
agency that specialized in working with mentally retarded 
individuals because the state had referred her to the agency 
because of her son‘s needs and not her own.80  In short, because 
the state had failed to tailor its efforts to the mother‘s mental 
disabilities, the judgment of termination was reversed, creating 
the possibility that the children would be returned to the 
mother‘s care and guaranteeing that a permanent solution to 
their care and custody would be delayed.  Conversely, a 
Massachusetts court reviewing similar facts would likely find 
that further efforts would be futile; or that the mother had not 
sufficiently cooperated in services herself; or that no services 
capable of curing the mother‘s parental deficiencies were 
available.81 
Although other states do not share California‘s requirement 
of clear and convincing evidence with regard to reasonable 
efforts, some states share the concern about closely matching 
services to the parental needs.  For instance, in an Oregon case, 
                                                                                                                        
 
80 Id. 
81 See supra Part II.A.  In contrast, California courts have continued to 
strictly enforce the reasonable efforts requirement in recent years.  For instance, 
in one case it found that reasonable efforts had not been made when a series of 
logistical problems, most of which related to the maternal grandmother who 
was caring for the child, led to a delay in counseling services.  In re Alvin R., 134 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 210, 216-18 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).  In another case, the appellate 
court delayed the permanent placement of a child who had been in state custody 
since he was four days old because the state agency could not show that it 
provided services to the child‘s mother, who suffered from a serious mental 
illness.  In re Daniel G., 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 75, 78-80 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).  
Nonetheless, California‘s approach to the reasonable efforts requirement is 
somewhat schizophrenic.  While the cases discussed here demonstrate that 
California has sometimes imposed more stringent requirements on its child 
protection agency than other states have imposed on theirs, California has 
completely eliminated the requirement in other cases.  By statute, California 
allows the state to bypass reunification efforts entirely when two experts testify 
that the parent has a mental disability that renders him or her incapable of 
benefiting from those efforts.  See Nina Wasow, Planned Failure: California‘s 
Denial of Reunification Services to Parents with Mental Disabilities, 31 N.Y.U. 
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 183, 183-84 (2006). 
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the court reversed a judgment terminating a mentally ill 
mother‘s parental rights to her young child.  The court found 
that the newborn had been ―dumped in her mother‘s lap‖ 
without any immediate provision for the mother‘s considerable 
needs for mental health treatment.  The court acknowledged 
that the child had formed a very real bond with foster parents 
during eighteen months of foster care and that it was troubling 
to break this bond to allow the mother another opportunity to 
raise her child.  Nonetheless, the court decided to take this 
route.82 
Similarly, a New York appellate court reversed a judgment of 
termination of the parental rights of a mother who had been 
found wandering with her infant children.83  The court found 
the state failed to use reasonable efforts because it did nothing 
to monitor the mother‘s outpatient treatment or link her with 
services after her discharge from the hospital.  The court made 
this decision even though there was significant evidence that the 
mother would not have complied with mental health services 
even if the state had done more.84  The court found that it would 
be improper to speculate on whether the mother would have 
participated in services had they been offered and provided the 
mother with another chance to raise her children.85  The most 
remarkable thing about this case is that the children had been in 
foster care for ten years at the time of the decision; the mother 
had visited with the children infrequently, and at least at some 
points her proposed plan for the children was that they stay in 
foster care until they were ready for college.86  Thus, it seems 
                                                                                                                        
 
82 See State ex rel. Juvenile Dep‘t of Multnomah County v. Habas, 700 P.2d 
225, 230-31 (Or. 1985) (noting that failure to use reasonable efforts was not the 
sole reason for reversal in this case, as the court was also concerned about the 
state‘s failure to satisfy statutory pleading requirements). 
83 In re Star A., 435 N.E.2d 1080 (N.Y. 1982). 
84 The dissent asserted that the state would have needed to make 
―relentless‖ efforts to assure the mother remained linked with services.  Id. at 
1085 (Meyer, J., dissenting). 
85 Id. at 1083.   
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fair to say that in this case, the court elevated the need to 
enforce the reasonable efforts requirements over the needs of 
the children for permanency. 
In short, it is painful to contemplate the consequences of 
judicial decisions such as these, which strictly enforce the 
reasonable efforts requirement.  When appellate courts take this 
approach, permanent placement for the children is delayed 
while the state again attempts to match the parents with services 
that satisfactorily demonstrate reasonable efforts.  Indeed, the 
courts‘ decisions in these cases might well result in children 
being  subjected to another round of upheavals in their living 
situations, shuttling between natural parent and foster or pre-
adoptive parent.  This is a disheartening result.  As the Iowa 
Supreme Court has repeatedly noted, ―[t]he crucial days of 
childhood cannot be suspended.‖87 
Nonetheless, the lax treatment of the reasonable efforts 
requirement described in Part B above is also seriously flawed.  
So what is an appellate judge faced with unimpressive efforts 
towards reunification to do?  Is the judge truly provided only 
with the Hobson‘s choice of deciding between ratifying 
inadequate efforts by the state and delaying permanency and 
stability for abused and neglected children?  The remainder of 
this article will focus on possible alternative approaches to this 
problem that would help avoid the quandary currently faced by 
appellate judges in these cases. 
III. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE REASONABLE 
EFFORTS CONUNDRUM 
A. MORE PRECISE DEFINITION OF THE REASONABLE 
EFFORTS REQUIREMENT 
One possible solution to the quandary faced by courts 
reviewing whether reasonable efforts have been exercised is for 
                                                                                                                        
86 Id. at 1086 (Meyer, J., dissenting).  It should be noted that given the new 
timeframes contained in ASFA it would be unlikely for a child protection case to 
drag on for such a long time without resolution at the present time.  See supra 
notes 31-32 and accompanying text. 
87 In re K.C., 660 N.W.2d 29, 35 (Iowa 2003) (quoting In re A.C., 415 
N.W.2d 609, 613 (Iowa 1987)). 
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states to fill the gap created by the failure of Congress to define 
reasonable efforts.  States can accomplish this goal by providing 
a more precise definition themselves.  A number of states have 
taken this approach and enacted statutes that provide more 
direction to their child protection agencies regarding 
reunification services.88 
For instance, Minnesota has a detailed statute governing 
reasonable efforts.  It defines reasonable efforts as ―the exercise 
of due diligence by the responsible social service agency to use 
culturally appropriate and available services to meet the needs 
of the child and the child‘s family.‖89  The statute further places 
the burden on the state to show that it has exercised reasonable 
efforts and requires the juvenile court to make findings of fact 
and conclusion of law on the question of reasonable efforts.  
Finally, the statute gives the juvenile court specific guidelines to 
consider when evaluating the state‘s efforts.  The court should 
consider whether the services were ―(1) relevant to the safety 
and protection of the child; (2) adequate to meet the needs of 
the child and family; (3) culturally appropriate; (4) available and 
accessible; (5) consistent and timely; and (6) realistic under the 
circumstances.‖90 
The Minnesota statute also codifies the circumstances under 
which reasonable efforts are excused.91  For the most part, this 
                                                                                                                        
 
88 The federal government has attempted to give the states some guidance 
in this area. The Federal Children‘s Bureau, a division of the Department of 
Health and Human Services, has issued guidelines for states with regard to 
reasonable efforts.  These guidelines suggest courts use a variety of factors in 
determining whether reasonable efforts have been made.  These factors include 
the specific dangers to the children involved, whether services relate specifically 
to the family‘s needs, whether the state agency was diligent in arranging 
services, and whether those services were appropriate and timely.  Crossley, 
supra note 2, at 313. 
89 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.012(f) (West 2008).  This definition applies 
equally to the efforts the state must exert to reunify families and the efforts the 
state must exert to provide the child with a permanent placement once it has 
determined that reunification with the family of origin is not feasible.  See § 
260.012(a), (e). 
90 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.012 (h). 
91 Id. 
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section of the statute mirrors the exceptions to the reasonable 
efforts requirement set out in the federal statute.92  Additionally, 
the statute permits the court to determine that reasonable 
efforts are not necessary when they would be futile and 
therefore unreasonable under the circumstances.93  Minnesota 
thereby accomplishes by statute the practice of excusing states 
from ―going through the motions‖ that many state courts have 
achieved by their common-law interpretations of the reasonable 
efforts requirement.94  While the merits of this approach are 
certainly debatable,95 at least Minnesota has stated a legislative 
preference for this means of dealing with difficult odds in 
reunification cases. 
Colorado, likewise, has developed a more comprehensive 
definition of reasonable efforts in its statutes.  Colorado requires 
that each of its counties and cities provides services to families 
and children who are in out-of-home placements.96  The statute 
further provides that certain services ―shall‖ be available to 
families in its care and protection system.97  The statute goes on 
to require certain additional services ―based upon the state‘s 
capacity to increase federal funding or any other moneys 
appropriated.‖98  The enumerated services include concrete 
assistance, such as child care, transportation, in-home 
homemaker services, and financial services likely to be helpful 
to overwhelmed and embattled parents.99  In addition, the 
services include mental health, drug and alcohol treatment, 
                                                                                                                        
 
92 Compare id., with 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15). 
93 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.012(a)(5). 
94 See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
95 See Bean, supra note 32, at 337-43. 
96 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-3-208(1) (West 2008).  
97 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-3-208(2)(b) (West 2008).  These services 
include basic services such as screening, assessments and individual case plans, 
home based crisis and family counseling, referrals to private and public 
resources, visitation and placement, including emergency shelter.  Id. 
98 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-3-208(2)(d) (West 2008). 
99 Id. 
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presumably to address the problems that are at the root of so 
many care and protection cases.100 
The benefit of these statutes to an appellate court is clear.  
When a state more precisely defines reasonable efforts, the 
reviewing court can compare the efforts of the state actually 
made in a particular case against the efforts required by the 
statute to determine if the state has fulfilled its duty.  By 
contrast, states that use the term reasonable efforts without 
further definition provide no guidance to the appellate court 
about how the reasonableness of the efforts is to be measured.  
Therefore, in states with a more precise definition of reasonable 
efforts, the danger that an appellate court will so significantly 
minimize the requirement as to adjudicate it out of existence is 
greatly reduced.  Whatever one‘s position on the issue of 
whether services should be offered in the first place, it cannot be 
good practice for a state to establish a requirement in a statute 
and then systematically ignore that requirement in judicial 
decisions. 
A more precise definition is also helpful in states that have 
been more demanding in their enforcement of the reasonable 
efforts requirement.101  In those states, the reviewing courts may 
apply expectations to child protection agencies that are simply 
unrealistic given issues such as difficult-to-access services, high 
case loads, and uncooperative parents.  When the state 
legislature has more specifically defined the reasonable efforts 
requirement, appellate courts have some guidance on how to 
evaluate the reasonableness of the efforts.  Thus, the more 
precise definition of reasonable efforts can guard against 
unnecessarily prolonging a child‘s drift in the foster care system. 
But the greatest value of such legislation is probably at the 
front-end of the system - in the child protection agency itself.  
More precise definitions of reasonable efforts can be 
enormously helpful to front-line workers in state care and 
protection services.  The challenges faced by these workers 
cannot be overstated.  Every day they are charged with making 
difficult, value-laden decisions about the families torn by 
tremendous social and psychological problems.  The 
                                                                                                                        
 
100 Id. 
101 See supra Part II.B. 
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consequences of making an incorrect decision about a family 
can literally be fatal.102  In addition, many of these front-line 
workers are undertrained and overworked.  In view of these 
pressures, vagueness over how much effort they are required to 
exert to reunify families only serves to make an already difficult 
job nearly impossible.  It seems only fair to give these workers, 
as well as the families and the courts, statutory guidance on 
what constitutes reasonable efforts. 
The same considerations also apply to the upper levels of the 
child protection system.  Burnout and rapid turnover 
consistently plague the highest administrative levels of child 
protection systems.103  Often each change in administrators 
brings a drastic change in philosophy and clinical priorities for 
the department.104  Thus, within a very short period of time, a 
state or local child protection system might be headed by 
different directors with entirely different views of the reasonable 
efforts requirement.  This works a great burden on the front-line 
staff who must constantly adapt to changes in philosophy in 
their daily practice.105 
One example suffices to illustrate the difficulties.  Social 
work professionals can have a reasonable difference of opinion 
as to whether parents should be offered concrete services such 
as transportation, housekeeping, or financial assistance when 
working toward reunification.  One valid professional viewpoint 
is that providing such services fosters dependence and actually 
                                                                                                                        
 
102 See Kim, supra note 26, at n.63 (stating that ―[t]here are far too many 
deaths to document,‖ but providing details of the deaths of eight children who 
died at the hands of their parent/abusers after or during the intervention of a 
state child protection agency). 
103 Jim Moye & Roberta Rinker, It‘s A Hard Knock Life: Does the Adoption 
and Safe Families Act of 1997 Adequately Address Problems in the Child 
Welfare System?, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 375, 383 (2002). 
104 Id. (referencing a twelve year study by the Urban Institute reporting that 
respondents to the study complained that their agencies continually fluctuated 
between a philosophy emphasizing family preservation and a philosophy 
emphasizing child safety). 
105 Id. (noting that such changes in leadership also have an impact on 
families in the system who may have come to expect multiple services under one 
administration only to have those services withdrawn in another). 
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discourages parents from taking the lead in attending to their 
parental responsibilities.  Another equally valid professional 
viewpoint is that such concrete services are exactly what parents 
need to get their lives back on track and in fact are much more 
immediately helpful than any number of anger management or 
parenting skills classes. 
When a state‘s statutes or regulations spell out at least 
generally what services should be included in the reasonable 
efforts package, there is no need to revisit this question each 
time there is a change at the upper levels of administration.  
Instead, front-line workers have a consistent understanding of 
what is and is not expected of them.  Moreover, providing these 
front-line workers with more detail about how the state views 
the term ―reasonable efforts,‖ makes it easier for them to know 
what to do in the course of attempting to effect reunification.  
When this is the case, workers can exert their efforts to 
implement actual services as opposed to trying to discern what 
exactly they should be doing. 
Another advantage of more detailed legislation is that there 
is some evidence that the mere act of providing a more precise 
definition in the statute leads to more aggressive delivery of 
reunification services by state agencies.  Although it is difficult 
to tell whether this is a direct result of the more precise 
definition,106 a review of both Minnesota and Colorado cases 
suggests a fairly rigorous approach to reunification efforts in 
those states.  For instance, in In re Welfare of Children of 
S.W.,107 the Minnesota Appeals Court found that the state had 
complied with the reasonable efforts requirement when the 
mother had received an impressive array of services, including 
intensive mental health treatment that involved almost daily 
contact with her mental health worker.  The worker offered both 
concrete assistance in terms of arranging transportation and 
setting up appointments, and substantial emotional support.  
The mother also received parenting training, psychological 
                                                                                                                        
 
106 At least one commentator has concluded that states that have defined 
reasonable efforts have more successfully complied with the obligation to 
exercise those efforts.  See Crossley, supra note 2, at 313. 
107 In re Welfare of Children of S.W., 727 N.W.2d 144 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2007). 
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evaluations, individual therapy and a substantial number of 
supervised and unsupervised visitation ultimately totaling three 
weekly two-hour visits.108  The court found that this 
encompassed all of the services available in the area.109  In 
addition, the agency had extended the deadline for changing the 
goal for the children from reunification to adoption in order to 
allow the mother time to deal with her serious mental health 
problems.110  In short, the efforts of the state in this case seemed 
both exhaustive and specifically designed to assist this particular 
mother with her individual needs. 
Moreover, the Minnesota cases reflect an effort by the state‘s 
Department to provide concrete services.  For instance, in one 
case, the state provided a free bus pass and paid for babysitting 
services in order for a mother to attend visits with her children 
and school conferences on their behalf and for her to attend 
recommended drug treatment programs.111  In another case, the 
state provided housekeepers, in-home skills counselor and in-
home public health nurses, along with a broad array of 
outpatient services in an attempt to cure the parents‘ 
multifaceted problems dealing with four young children.112  In 
each of these cases, the appellate court found reasonable efforts 
had been made and that termination of parental rights was 
appropriate; however, the broad range, number and aggressive 
nature of the services offered in these cases suggest that simply 
providing a more comprehensive definition of reasonable efforts 
                                                                                                                        
 
108 Id. at 150.  By contrast, this author has observed that the Massachusetts 
practice is to provide one-hour of weekly visits for children who are in foster 
care when the stated goal remains reunification.  This is changed to once 
monthly visits for the period of time between the change of goal to adoption and 
termination of parental rights by a trial court.  
109 Id. at 148.   
110 Id. at 150. 
111 In re Welfare of D.T.J., 554 N.W.2d 104, 109 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996).  
There is some evidence that such concrete services are more effective in 
facilitating reunification than other, more insight-oriented services.  See infra 
note 127. 
112 In re Welfare of A.R.G.-B., 551 N.W.2d 256, 258-59 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1996). 
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in the state statute serves to motivate the state to take the 
requirement more seriously. 
This hypothesis is borne out by reviewing decisions in 
Colorado.  As in Minnesota, the mere existence of detail in the 
statute seems to have an effect on the number, type and 
intensity of services offered to families.  For instance, in one 
case, a developmentally disabled mother challenged the state‘s 
efforts because the state did not assure that she received services 
from a specific agency specializing in serving individuals with 
developmental disabilities.113  The Colorado Court of Appeals 
found that the reasonable efforts requirement was nonetheless 
satisfied because for eleven months the mother received forty-
four hours of weekly in-home family preservations services.  
These services included hands-on repetitive instruction about 
parenting skills, nutrition, budgeting, and basic life skills.  The 
family preservation worker and the mother‘s case worker were 
aware of her developmental disabilities and adjusted their 
services to accommodate issues associated with her problems.  
Moreover, the mother ultimately received services from the 
agency specializing in developmental disabilities, including 
being placed with a host family.  Thus, although the mother may 
have been disappointed with the outcome, the court‘s 
determination that the mother had received sufficient help from 
the state seems completely reasonable.114 
A comparison of these Minnesota and Colorado decisions 
with the decisions examined in Part II of this article seems to 
demonstrate some clear advantages to developing a more 
precise statutory definition of reasonable efforts.115  As an initial 
matter, it appears that when a state statute more specifically 
defines reasonable efforts, the state care and protection agency 
may do more to attempt reunification.  This is advantageous for 
several reasons.  First, the state‘s efforts may work as intended—
i.e. they might preserve families where permanent removal of 
                                                                                                                        
 
113 People ex rel. J.M., 74 P.3d 475 (Colo. App. 2003). 
114 Id. at 477. 
115 Appellate judges in states that have not enacted legislation defining 
reasonable efforts might instead be guided by the federal guidelines designed to 
assist states in refining the term.  See Crossley, supra note 2, at 313. 
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the children ultimately proves unnecessary.  This is a highly 
desirable result if one assumes, as federal and state legislation 
does, that the best outcome for children is to remain with their 
natural families in a safe and healthy environment.  
Additionally, reunification preserves the state‘s scarce 
resources; because of the high cost of long-term foster care, 
effective reunification services that result in children being 
returned to their home more quickly are likely much more cost 
effective.116  Even if this was not true, no state has an 
inexhaustible number of potential adoptive families who are 
equipped to handle the substantial emotional challenges of 
caring for traumatized children who are not reunified with their 
parents. 
In short, there seem to be multiple advantages and few 
disadvantages to further defining the reasonable efforts 
requirement at the state level.  While there may be some 
concern that more precise definitions might lead to less 
flexibility for child protection agencies, the definitions 
themselves could be structured to allow for diversity in services.  
In fact, a definition that demanded that state child protection 
agencies use the best practices and research available at a given 
time might serve as an impetus to the further development of 
research in the reasonable efforts arena. 
B. USE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH 
Although hundreds of reasonable efforts decisions have been 
made around the country, I have found none that address the 
question of which specific programs have actually proven useful 
in reuniting troubled families.  Courts rely on logic and intuition 
with regard to what services might help families reunite rather 
than any empirical proof of efficacy.  Thus, it appears that courts 
may be ignoring a significant tool that would assist them in 
judging whether a state agency has used reasonable efforts to 
reunite a family.  Certainly, it seems that part of the analysis 
should be whether the state is delivering services that have a 
proven record of success in child protection cases. 
                                                                                                                        
 
116 See, e.g., Sally K. Christie, Foster Care Reform in New York City: Justice 
for All, 36 COLUM J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 33 (2002). 
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Nonetheless, this is no easy task.  There has been very little 
research conducted on the question of the effectiveness of 
reunification services.  Indeed, the existing research is 
―especially thin, even by child welfare standards.‖117  Moreover, 
there are significant problems for judges in evaluating the 
quality of such research.  Indeed judges attempting to evaluate 
research might feel that they are being pulled in opposite 
directions depending on what study they are reading.  
This difficulty is well illustrated by reviewing research about 
a particular program in the related area of family preservation. 
The emphasis of a family preservation program differs from 
reunification programs because of the point of intervention.  
Family preservation programs are designed to intervene in a 
family‘s life before the children are removed from the home; 
whereas family reunification programs are implemented after a 
child has been removed from the home.118  There has been 
substantial research about the value of one particular family 
preservation program; however, the problem is that the research 
itself is very conflicting. 
The program at issue is ―Homebuilders,‖ an intensive 
intervention model developed in Washington State in the early 
1970s.119  Multiple studies of the use of this model have 
demonstrated that families who receive ―intensive family 
preservation services‖ under this model fare better than families 
in a control group.120  However, a federally funded study of five 
family preservation programs throughout the country debunked 
these findings and determined that families receiving intensive 
services were not able to avoid foster-care placement any better 
                                                                                                                        
 
117 Fred Wulczyn, Family Reunification, 14:1 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 95, 
108 (2004), available at 
http://www.princeton.edu/futureofchildren/publications/docs/14_01_FullJou
rnal.pdf. 
118 Kelly, supra note 12, at 359. 
119 Richard Wexler, Take the Child and Run: Tales From the Age of ASFA, 
36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 129, 136-37 (2001). 
120 Id. at 141. 
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than families in a control group.121  This study, in turn, was 
heavily criticized by a professor at the University of North 
Carolina School of Social Work, who concluded that the study 
was defective on a number of grounds and therefore 
unreliable.122  Given this morass of conflicting evidence, both 
trial and appellate court judges might well throw up their hands 
and determine that there is little help to be found in social 
science research.123 
Despite this problem, it may be worthwhile for appellate 
court judges to review the evidence related to the reunification 
programs because there is some consistency with regard to the 
evidence.  First, if nothing else, research has been able to 
identify characteristics of families most likely to benefit from 
reunification services.  Specifically, reunification has been more 
successful with older children than younger children.124  
Moreover, families with multiple problems, or with children 
who have disabilities or serious emotional problems, are more 
difficult to reunify.125  Different appellate judges may find this 
information enlightening for entirely different reasons.  For 
                                                                                                                        
 
121 Westat et al., Evaluation of Family Preservation and Reunification 
Programs: Final Report (Dec. 2002), available at 
http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/evalfampres94/Final/Vol1/index.htm. 
122 Wexler, supra note 119, at 142-43. 
123 Robert Kelly, who has studied the efficacy of family reunification 
programs, has along with a co-author, attempted to provide some assistance in 
assessing the validity of social science research to judges.  See Robert F. Kelly & 
Sarah H. Ramsey, Assessing and Communicating Social Science Information in 
Family and Child Judicial Settings: Standards for Judges and Allied 
Professionals, 45 FAM. CT. REV. 22 (2007);  Robert F. Kelly & Sarah H. Ramsey, 
Assessing Social Science Studies: Eleven Tips for Judges and Lawyers,  40 
FAM. L.Q. 367 (2006).  Both of these articles illustrate that unless a judge is 
thoroughly educated in research methods and statistics, it is a daunting task to 
evaluate the complexities of social science research. 
124 See Kelly, supra note 12, at 384.  Kelly‘s work attempted to provide ―a 
systematic review and synthesis of findings of evaluations of [family 
reunification programs] with the goal of developing a social science knowledge 
base for child protection legal practitioners (judges, court professional staff, and 
attorneys representing parents, children, and human services agencies).‖  Id. at 
360-61. 
125 See id. at 385; Wulczyn, supra note 117, at 99-100. 
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instance, in one state, appellate courts may determine that fewer 
efforts should be required when a state agency is attempting to 
reunify a very young disabled child with parents who have 
multiple problems because reunification is less likely to be 
successful in the end.  Or, a state‘s appellate courts could take 
the contrary view that the state must be much more aggressive 
when faced with such families and not limit itself to the steps 
taken when attempting to reunify an older, non-disabled child 
with parents who have fewer problems.  Nonetheless, a court 
charged with evaluating reasonable efforts could certainly 
benefit from having this information about the relative difficulty 
of reuniting certain types of families in order to make an 
informed evaluation of whether the state has done enough. 
In addition, while the empirical evidence about reunification 
programs may be thin, there is some evidence about which 
approaches are most effective.  Robert Kelly, in his review of 
research studies evaluating family reunification programs, 
found that several approaches were apt to be more successful 
than others.  First, he found that a ―managed care‖ approach 
that focused on intensive in-home services was most likely to be 
successful.126  Second, he found that concrete services, such as 
―emergency cash, housing, medical care, food, transportation, 
assistance with gaining employment, and/or assistance with 
securing public assistance‖ were associated with success, 
especially with very low-income families.127  He also found that 
more lengthy treatment programs with well-trained and 
experienced staff tended to be successful.128 
Fred Wulczyn, in his article about reunification services 
stressed that because studies of reunification services are 
limited, professionals in this area must rely more on observation 
about what works than empirical evidence.129  However, he 
noted that such observation demonstrates that there are several 
―promising practices‖ in reunification services.130  These include 
                                                                                                                        
 
126 Kelly, supra note 12, at 378-79. 
127 Id. at 380.  
128 Id. at 382-84.   
129 See Wulczyn, supra note 117, at 108. 
130 Id. at 108. 
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―strengths-based family services,‖ intensive family visitation, 
developmental awareness, ongoing aftercare and cultural 
sensitivity.131  He also noted that research establishes that 
comprehensive and theory based interventions that involve 
―thoughtful implementation of comprehensive and holistic 
approaches to addressing the needs of family and children in 
foster care can have positive effects.‖132  Certainly appellate 
judges charged with having to assess the reasonableness of a 
state agency‘s efforts could benefit from at least possessing 
knowledge of these observations. 
The potential importance of such social science research is 
apparent when reviewing one easily isolated reunification 
service—visitation.  The importance of visitation between 
natural parents and children placed in foster care has repeatedly 
been noted as crucial to reunification.133  In addition, the quality 
of visitation is related to success.  Child welfare agencies often 
limit visitation to one-hour or ninety minutes in a cramped 
room at a social services agency.  During these visits, the parent 
might have to tend to the needs of multiple children of different 
ages under the eye of a social worker who is recording his or her 
observations.  Research shows, however, that reunification is far 
more likely when visitation occurs at the foster home where the 
parent can engage in normal activities such as putting them to 
bed or feeding them a meal.134  Given this evidence, an appellate 
judge should question whether the child protection agency that 
offers only visits in an office setting is truly exercising 
reasonable efforts. 
In addition, it is crucially important for appellate judges to 
be aware of the research involving the importance of providing 
                                                                                                                        
 
131 Id. at 108-09. 
132 Id. at 109.  
133 See, e.g., U.S. DEP‘T. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CHILDREN‘S 
BUREAU: CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, FAMILY REUNIFICATION: WHAT 
THE EVIDENCE SHOWS (2006), available at 
http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/issue_briefs/family_reunification/index.cf
m; Margaret Beyer, Too Little, Too Late: Designing Family Support to Succeed, 
22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 311, 336-37 (1996). 
134 Beyer, supra note 133, at 338. 
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―culturally competent‖ reunification services.135  Culturally 
competent services are those that ―have the capacity to . . . 
respond to the unique needs of populations whose cultures are 
different than that which might be called dominant or 
mainstream American.‖136  Culturally sensitive reunification 
services are vital given the over-representation of certain 
cultural groups in the nation‘s child protection system.137  
Appellate judges must be sensitive to the need to tailor services 
to parents who may be outside the mainstream culture and face 
difficulties related to language barriers and cultural 
expectations. 138 
In short, in view of even this limited research,  judges should 
be reviewing child welfare agencies‘ efforts with a view to 
whether they are providing concrete and comprehensive 
services rather than the scattershot menu of services so often 
seen in service plans.  Indeed, without such review, the tendency 
of agencies can be to develop service plans only loosely 
connected with the needs of a family. 139 
                                                                                                                        
 
135 It is beyond the purview of this article to extensively examine the need 
for culturally competent services, but it is imperative for any professional 
involved in the child protection system to be aware of this concern.  At least one 
state, Minnesota, requires that services be delivered in a culturally competent 
way.  See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text. 
136 Terry Cross, Developing a Knowledge Base to Support Cultural 
Competence, 14 FAM. RESOURCE COALITION REP. 2, 3-4 (1995-96).  
137 According to one 2008 article, African-American children comprise less 
than one-half of the nation‘s children, but more than one-fifth of the foster care 
population.  See Clement supra note 10, at 413 (noting that African-American 
children in the child welfare system are more likely to be removed from their 
homes than white children). In addition, Latino and Native Americans make up 
a disproportionate number of children in the foster care system.  See also 
Naomi R. Cahn, Children‘s Interests in a Familial Context: Poverty, Foster 
Care, and Adoption, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1189, 1198-99 (1999).   
138 Cahn, supra note 137, at 1212.  
139 I have often been dismayed by the cookie cutter approach to 
reunification efforts contained in some of the service plans for my appellate 
clients.  For instance, at times parents who have never shown signs of a drug 
problem must engage in random drug screens or parents must attend anger 
management groups that have not been evaluated for their effectiveness.  Beyer 
has also criticized this approach at length, illustrating that it can do more harm 
than good.  She provides an example of a highly typical component of a service 
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Judges may well be reluctant to question the clinical 
decisions of a child welfare agency, which after all, presumably 
will have some expertise on the issues before it.  However, it 
seems entirely reasonable that judges should be provided with 
research about the most successful means of reunification when 
they are charged with assessing whether a child welfare agency 
has fulfilled its legal obligations in this regard.  It would not 
seem a difficult matter to use some of the money set aside for 
states to effect reunification efforts to keep judges educated and 
updated on available information.  If this were to happen, judges 
faced with seemingly perfunctory or mechanical service plans 
might be more apt to challenge child welfare agencies to do 
better by declining to rule that the reasonable efforts 
requirement has been satisfied. 
C. DECOUPLING THE REASONABLE EFFORTS REQUIREMENT 
FROM THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS 
DETERMINATION 
Another, perhaps more radical approach to dealing with the 
reasonable efforts problem, is to rethink the rationale for 
making reasonable efforts a precondition for the termination of 
parental rights (―TPR‖) and freeing children for adoption.  
Nothing in the ASFA requires states to make reasonable efforts a 
condition precedent to terminating parental rights.140  
Moreover, the constitutional standards governing TPR require 
only that a court find by clear and convincing evidence that a 
                                                                                                                        
plan: ―Ms. Lawrence must attend parenting skills class.‖  Beyer, supra note 133, 
at 314-15.  As Beyer notes, this component of the service plan does not examine 
the needs of the hypothetical Ms. Lawrence.  If it did, it might note that while 
Ms. Lawrence loves her children, she often has difficulty coping with their needs 
for long periods of time and loses control of herself.  This diagnosis indicates 
that Ms. Lawrence does not necessarily need parenting classes to help cope with 
her anger.  She may instead need the services of a babysitter to give her an 
occasional break.  The author also notes a further problem with this service 
plan; it is not logically connected to her needs.  The consequences of this can be 
disastrous, because as Beyer notes, if Ms. Lawrence becomes defensive and does 
not attend parenting classes she may be accused of not caring for her children.  
Id. at 315.  In such an instance, the service plan might actually act to impede, 
not encourage reunification.  Certainly, such plans do not constitute a 
―reasonable effort‖ to reunify. 
140 See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text. 
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parent is unfit and that termination is in the child‘s best 
interests.141  Nonetheless, approximately one half of the states 
have statutes requiring the state to show reasonable efforts 
before a parent‘s rights can be terminated and the child freed for 
adoption.142  Moreover, even in states where reasonable efforts 
are not explicitly a precondition to termination, statutes can 
implicitly create such a requirement.143  In short, although 
neither Congress nor the constitution requires it, most states 
have assumed that child welfare agencies must make reasonable 
efforts before a parent‘s rights can be terminated. 
The drawbacks of this approach are apparent from the cases 
outlined in Part II above in which children were deprived of 
permanency because of the state‘s failure to offer sufficient 
services to the parents during their time in foster care.  Indeed, 
to many reasonable people the prospect of a vulnerable child 
being left to drift in foster care because of the combined failings 
of a child welfare bureaucracy and abusive or neglectful parents 
is simply intolerable.  Given this, one must wonder why states 
have preconditioned permanency for their abused and neglected 
children on reasonable efforts. 
Perhaps the most logical explanation is that there is an 
assumption that if reasonable efforts are not a precondition to 
termination, there would be no way to enforce the requirement 
at all.  In essence, making termination dependent on reasonable 
efforts can be likened to the exclusionary rule in criminal law.  
The exclusionary rule has long been assumed to act as a 
deterrent; that is, police officers, faced with the opportunity to 
cut legal corners presumably do not because they know the 
                                                                                                                        
 
141 See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982). 
142 Kim, supra note 26, at 304. 
143 See David J. Herring, Inclusion of the Reasonable Efforts Requirement 
in Termination of Parental Rights Statutes: Punishing the Child for the 
Failures of the State Child Welfare System, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 139, 178 (1992).  
Massachusetts is one such state.  Its termination statute contains fourteen non-
exclusive factors for the court to consider when deciding to terminate parental 
rights.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 210, § 3(c)(i)-(xiv) (2008).  Four of these factors 
require the court to consider whether the parents were offered or received 
services to correct the problem but refused or were unable to productively 
utilize the services on a consistent basis.  Id. § 3(c)(ii)-(vi). 
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evidence they will obtain under those circumstances cannot be 
used to convict a criminal.  Similarly, child welfare workers who 
are tempted to cut corners in providing services to parents will 
likely be deterred if they know that the children they are 
working with cannot be freed for adoption until they fulfill their 
obligation. 
Whatever the merits of this logic, it seems both a draconian 
and ineffective approach to dealing with the problem.  If the 
reasonable efforts requirement is strictly enforced, it places the 
biggest burden of failure, not on the shoulders of negligent 
parents and lethargic or overwhelmed caseworkers, but on 
victimized children, effectively victimizing the children again.  
When judges strive to avoid this result, the requirement can be 
so watered down as to lose meaning.144  Thus, the irony is that 
making TPR dependent on satisfying the reasonable efforts 
requirement imposes no deterrent effect on lax caseworkers and 
agencies whatsoever.  When these parties can reliably predict 
that the reasonable efforts requirement will receive lenient 
treatment, families that might be reunited if reasonable efforts 
were employed do not receive the services they need.  Given this 
perverse result, it would behoove states to consider decoupling 
the reasonable efforts determination from the decision about 
termination of parental rights.  However, at the same time, 
states should add provisions to their laws that would encourage 
the delivery of services to needy families as intended by the 
federal legislation in the first place. 
One possible approach is to remove reasonable efforts as a 
condition precedent to termination while at the same time 
requiring more judicial scrutiny of reasonable efforts at earlier 
stages of a child welfare case.  As one author notes, there are 
usually multiple hearings in a child welfare case prior to a 
hearing on termination of parental rights.  More vigorous 
monitoring of what services are being offered; whether those 
services are targeted at the problems the family is experiencing 
and whether they are likely to be effective could be done at these 
hearings.145 
                                                                                                                        
 
144 See supra Part II.A. 
145 See Herring, supra note 141, at 203-04. 
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Such an approach is essentially consistent with the ASFA 
which requires a judicial assessment of reasonable efforts at the 
point a child is removed from the home and then to establish 
that the state has made efforts to allow the child to return 
home.146  While the ASFA does not require assessments at each 
stage of child protection legislation, its requirements provide a 
floor, not a ceiling.  States are free to require reasonable efforts 
at as many junctures of a child welfare case as they choose.147  
This approach may indeed be more effective in enforcing the 
reasonable efforts requirement than to pair it with the decision 
on TPR.  Certainly, stricter monitoring of whether a family is 
receiving effective services at an early stage of a child welfare 
case can be far more helpful in either salvaging the family or 
moving forward to permanency than a post-hoc determination 
of reasonable efforts at the termination stage.148 
In addition, states, by statute or common-law, could require 
more exacting scrutiny of reasonable efforts from judges.  
Currently, often the only documentation a judge makes with 
regard to reasonable efforts is to check off a box on a pre-printed 
form.149  Check-off formats such as this not only permit casual 
assessments of reasonable efforts, they may in fact encourage 
them.  To combat this, states could impose a requirement that 
judges make detailed, written findings with regard to reasonable 
                                                                                                                        
 
146 See Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 
2115 (1997) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).    
147 At least two states, California and Ohio, require by statute that the court 
make a reasonable efforts assessment at each stage of the court process.  Alice C. 
Shotton, Making Reasonable Efforts in Child Abuse and Neglect Cases: Ten 
Years Later, 26 CAL. W. L. REV. 223, 226-27 (1990). 
148 One commentator notes that in his experience practicing in the child 
welfare area in Pennsylvania, few judges assess reasonable efforts before the 
termination stage.  See Herring, supra note 141, at 194 n.161. Herring notes that 
―Only when TPR procedures roll around do the courts take the reasonable 
efforts requirement seriously. . . .  At this point, rehabilitation is usually 
hopeless and requiring the agency to make reasonable efforts at this late date 
merely punishes the child for the agency‘s failure.‖  Id. 
149 See Crossley, supra note 2, at 285; Herring supra note 143, at 153-54. 
Fall 2009 Rutgers Journal of Law & Public Policy Vol 7:1 
143 
efforts at each stage of the litigation.150  Judges are surely 
familiar with mandate; because of the high evidentiary burden 
in TPR cases they are required to make detailed findings of facts 
and conclusions of law to support their decisions.151 
Requiring judges to make detailed findings at early stages in 
the litigation has clear advantages.  The child protection agency 
would have an early and clear message about whether the court 
believes it is fulfilling its legal obligations and if not, what more 
needs to be done.  This information would be delivered in time 
for the agency to implement the judge‘s findings before deciding 
that efforts are hopeless and a TPR petition is necessary.  
Moreover, the approach has benefits even if not employed in 
stages of a case before the TPR hearing, and even when the state 
statute does not require reasonable efforts as a condition 
precedent to TPR.  The judge could still make detailed findings 
of fact that would outline specifically why the reasonable efforts 
requirement was not satisfied.  Although a negative finding 
would not derail the petition, the child protection agency would 
at least have guidance on whether it met its obligations and 
could adjust its methods accordingly in future cases. 
Moreover, judges could use additional weapons if faced with 
repeated failures to exercise reasonable efforts.  For instance, 
they could hold an agency in contempt or impose a fine.152  
While judges may be reluctant to impose sanctions on an 
overburdened, underfunded agency assigned to protect 
vulnerable children, most would find it more palatable than 
denying a child a permanent home because the reasonable 
efforts requirement has not been satisfied. 
In short, states are not required to link the reasonable efforts 
requirement to TPR.  Instead they seem to be driven to do so by 
an intuitive sense that the only way to enforce the requirement 
                                                                                                                        
 
150 Minnesota‘s reasonable efforts statute requires that judges make 
findings of fact and conclusions of law on the issue of reasonable efforts.  See 
supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
151 See, e.g., Custody of a Minor, 389 N.E.2d 68, 70 (Mass. 1976) (holding 
that given the constitutional concerns implicated when terminating parental 
rights, judges must make ―specific and detailed findings demonstrating that 
close attention has been given to the evidence‖). 
152 See Herring, supra note 141, at 204. 
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is to do so.  Given that alternatives not only seem to be available, 
but might actually be more effective in delivering reasonable 
efforts, states should explore changing their statutes to separate 
the reasonable efforts requirement from TPR determinations.  
The ironic and welcome consequence of such action might well 
be overall better enforcement of the reasonable efforts 
requirement. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
There are no perfect solutions to the dilemma posed by the 
reasonable efforts requirement.  It is almost certainly a good 
thing to require agencies that remove children from their 
families to make realistic attempts to return them at the earliest 
possible date.  Nonetheless, failures will inevitably occur and 
courts will repeatedly be faced with instances where the state 
has not met its legal obligation in this regard. 
Courts have sometimes addressed this failure by requiring a 
―do-over‖ and requiring states to reinitiate its attempts to 
reunite children with their families.  The drawbacks of this 
approach are so clear, and so potentially damaging to children, 
that courts have on many occasions instead glossed over the 
legal requirement of reasonable efforts. 
The child protection system, faced with this problem must 
pursue at least the best inadequate solution that it can.  The 
approaches outlined in this article—giving social services clear 
guidelines on what is expected of them; constantly monitoring 
social services research to determine what is most likely to help 
troubled families; providing judicial scrutiny of whether 
agencies are meeting their obligations at early rather than late 
stages; and imposing sanctions least likely to affect already 
victimized children—hold promise in making incremental 
change. 
